Bankruptcy law severity for debtors : comparative analysis among selected countries by Morawska, Sylwia et al.
 
 
European Research Studies Journal 
Volume XXIII, Special Issue 2, 2020   
 pp. 659-686 
  Bankruptcy Law Severity for Debtors:  
Comparative Analysis Among Selected Countries*         
Submitted 27/08/20, 1st revision 16/09/20, 2nd revision 10/10/20, accepted 30/11/20  
  
 Sylwia Morawska1, Błażej Prusak2, Przemysław Banasik3, 




Purpose: The objective of this paper is to propose the new indicator of bankruptcy law 
severity for debtors (BLSI-Bankruptcy Law Severity Index). On the basis of this index we 
conducted comparative analysis of debtor/creditor friendliness of bankruptcy laws among 27 
selected countries.    
Design/Methodology/Approach: In the research the following methods were used: analysis 
of legal acts, literature review and expert method.  
Findings: The empirical results show that the most debtor-friendly bankruptcy and 
restructuring laws are those of the USA, Ireland and Canada. At the opposite pole were 
Slovenia, Australia and Austria. It can also be noted that many EU countries have a similar 
level of BLSI measure, which is most likely a consequence of harmonisation activities 
undertaken within the Community.  
Practical Implications: The conducted research enables us to propose the direction of 
changes in bankruptcy and restructuring laws in the next stage.  
Originality/value: On the basis of proposed BLSI, we will be able to examine the 
relationship between the severity of bankruptcy law and innovation, entrepreneurship and 
the level of development of financial markets in the studied countries. 
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Bankruptcy Law Severity for Debtors:  





Failure to conduct business activity is a mechanism permanently inscribed in the 
functioning of market economies. One can even say that it is their distinctive feature. 
According to Schumpeter's concept (Schumpeter, 1942; 1982) called creative 
destruction, it is even a desirable and normal element. They influence the 
development of entrepreneurship and innovation. Moreover, the previous research 
also shows that entrepreneurs who previously declared bankruptcy acquire certain 
experience, start up again and run businesses successfully (Stam, Audretsch and 
Meijaard, 2008). It is a form of learning through the acquisition of knowledge and 
experience. However, it is important to be aware that the stigmatisation of 
unsuccessful entrepreneurs leads to limiting their returns to entrepreneurial activities 
and the setting up of new businesses by them (Simmons, Wiklund and Levie, 2014). 
 
The institution of bankruptcy plays a very important role in the process of 
entrepreneurs' insolvency. Due to the often large number of stakeholders 
representing different interests, it is difficult in many cases to conduct bankruptcy 
proceedings on market terms. Therefore, for many years now, such proceedings have 
been regulated by law and are often judicial in nature. There is also an ongoing 
discussion as to whether the models of bankruptcy law should be more or less 
restrictive towards the so-called honest debtors who were unsuccessful in business. 
In our opinion, the type of bankruptcy law model, as well as the efficiency of the 
judiciary system in the area of bankruptcy and restructuring proceedings through the 
barriers blocking market entry and exit, have a significant impact on the level of 
entrepreneurship and innovation. For example, in the United States, where 
bankruptcy law is considered to be one of the best in the world (Jackson and Skeel, 
2013), the level of acceptance of failure, and consequently, of willingness to take 
risk is much higher than in European countries.  This is related, among other things, 
to the bankruptcy law, which is less restrictive for debtors, and which enables a 
second chance policy. As a result, entrepreneurs are less afraid of failure and can 
start a new business relatively quickly after bankruptcy proceedings. Such a model 
also serves innovation more effectively, as entrepreneurs get more opportunities to 
create new ideas and solutions. Financial failure when introducing new ideas to the 
market does not disqualify them for years. It is often only a transitional stage at 
which they acquire experience and knowledge, and this in many cases contributes to 
the business success achieved at a later stage.  
 
Based on i.a. American solutions the European Commission started to promote and 
implement activities aimed at implementing second chance policies and increasing 
the effectiveness of bankruptcy proceedings in member states in the 21st century. 
These proposals were reflected in the following documents and legal acts: 
Overcoming the stigma of business failure - for a second chance policy. 
Implementing the Lisbon Partnership for Growth and Jobs (2007); Think Small 
First. A Small Business Act for Europe (2008); Business Dynamics: Start‐ups, 
Business Transfers and Bankruptcy. The economic impact of legal and 
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administrative procedures for licensing, business transfers and bankruptcy 
on entrepreneurship in Europe (2011); Report of the Expert Group: A Second 
Chance for Entrepreneurs: Prevention of Bankruptcy, Simplification of Bankruptcy 
Procedures and Support for a Fresh Start (2011); Commission Recommendation of 
12 March 2014 on a new approach to business failure and insolvency (2014); 
Entrepreneurship 2020. Action Plan. Reigniting the entrepreneurial spirit in Europe 
(2013); Directive (EU) 2019/1023 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
20 June 2019 on preventive restructuring frameworks, on discharge of debt and 
disqualifications, and on measures to increase the efficiency of procedures 
concerning restructuring, insolvency and discharge of debt (2019).  
 
This shows how important and valid this socio-economic problem is. To broaden our 
knowledge in this area, which is part of the Law and Economics research, we 
proposed to build a Bankruptcy Law Severity Index for Debtors, based on which the 
friendliness of bankruptcy law towards debtors can be assessed. Compared to several 
previous attempts to classify legal systems as more or less debtor-friendly, this 
measure contains more criteria and is quantifiable. Moreover, over time, bankruptcy 
laws evolve, mainly towards more debtor-friendly ones, therefore it is necessary to 
update this type of research. At the next stage, we conducted a comparative analysis 
of the value of this index in the selected EU countries as well as in the USA, Canada 
and Australia, which was the main objective of the research. The example of the 
United States was used as the basic benchmark for EU countries, and two other 
developed countries with extensive experience in the field of bankruptcy law, 
Canada and Australia, were also selected to enrich the analysis. The following 
research methods were used: analysis of legal acts, literature review and expert 
method. In addition to the introduction, the article contains an analysis of the 
literature; description and results of the research and conclusions. 
        
2. Literature Review 
 
Legal solutions for insolvent debtors date back many years B.C. and were originally 
very restrictive and even draconian for them. In many cases, prison sentences, 
slavery and even the death penalty were practised. It was unimportant whether the 
debtor fell into debt as a result of fraud or it was a consequence of business failures 
or random incidents. Over time, the approach to legal solutions related to insolvent 
persons has changed. The enforcement was carried out not against the person of the 
debtor but against his or her property. Moreover, following the example of the 
current bankruptcy proceedings, they began to have a collective character, i.e. one 
bankruptcy proceeding replaced several individual enforcement proceedings 
(Levinthal, 1918; White, 1977). As a result of the evolution of bankruptcy law, it has 
increasingly become more debtor-friendly. For example, in the UK, early in the 18th 
century, regulations that enabled debt reduction for debtors cooperating with the 
court, were introduced. This was due to a change in the approach to insolvency. 
Insolvency began to be treated as a condition that could result from the debtor's 
ineptitude and not as a crime.  
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On the other hand, however, the penalties for those debtors who refused to cooperate 
with the court were increased. Lack of cooperation was even punishable by the death 
penalty (Di Maritino, 2006). In the United States, which is often cited as an example 
of a country with one of the most efficient and debtor-friendly bankruptcy systems in 
the world, the first bankruptcy law was officially enacted in 1800 and was 
practically a copy of the regulation then in force in the United Kingdom (Tabb, 
1995). Subsequent legal acts amending the previous ones were adopted in 1841, 
1867 and 1898 respectively. The bankruptcy law of 1841 was a breakthrough since 
for the first time it was a voluntary procedure in which the debtor himself/herself 
could apply for bankruptcy proceedings.  
 
Moreover, the law provided for the possibility to reduce some part of the debt. The 
legal act of 1867 was the first in the world to provide for the declaration of 
bankruptcy of enterprises, while the bankruptcy law of 1898 introduced an 
arrangement procedure enabling reorganisation of enterprises (Delaney, 1998). 
Modern bankruptcy law was formed in the 19th and early 20th century. In addition 
to the above-mentioned solutions, Piasecki (1999) gives a special role to three acts 
regulating the issue of bankruptcy, namely the French Commercial Code, the Reich 
Insolvency Ordinance of 1877 and the Austrian Insolvency Ordinance of 1914. In 
addition to the countries mentioned above, significant changes in the shaping of 
insolvency law took place in other countries, such as Belgium, Scotland, Ireland, 
Canada, Australia, Denmark, Finland, Hungary, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, 
Portugal, Russia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland (Sgard, 2006; Brown, 1900). With the 
evolution of the bankruptcy law, the following directions of changes can be 
observed: 
     
1. Lenient treatment of debtors and enabling them to start again and allow 
them to set up a new business.  
2. Limitation or lack of penalties for debtors cooperating with the court.        
3. The occurrence of a voluntary application for the introduction of 
arrangement or recovery proceedings in many countries. This voluntariness 
provides the debtor with the right to apply, on his/her initiative, for the 
opening of arrangement or recovery proceedings. As for the application for 
the opening of bankruptcy proceedings, however, it is usually forced. 
4. Possibility of reducing part of the debt, paying in instalments or postponing 
the payment of the debt as a result of the approval of the agreement with the 
creditors. 
5. In many countries, separation of the bankruptcy law regulating the 
bankruptcy of enterprises and the bankruptcy law concerning the insolvency 
of natural persons.  
6. In addition to the general bankruptcy of enterprises, the insolvency law also 
provides for the regulation of specific activities such as banking and 
insurance activities, as well as the regulation concerning the bankruptcy of 
groups of companies and entities with assets in more than one country (the 
so-called cross-border bankruptcies).  
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7. Promoting activities aimed at keeping the debtor's business by reorganising 
it or selling it in its entirety, rather than ending the business by selling it in 
parts.  
8. Enabling out-of-court bankruptcy proceedings, which usually take the form 
of an agreement between the creditors and the debtor. Depending on the 
country, these types of proceedings may or may not be controlled by the 
court.  
9. Introduction of the so-called prepacked proceedings, i.e. out-of-court 
proceedings enabling the conclusion of an agreement between a debtor and 
creditors on the future of an insolvent company even before the 
commencement of judicial bankruptcy or restructuring proceedings.  
 
Despite some universal directions of change, the bankruptcy laws of individual 
countries still show many different features. The main criterion differentiating them 
is the friendliness of regulations towards debtors and creditors. Therefore, in the 
subject literature, a distinction is made between legal systems that are more debtor- 
or creditor-friendly and the so-called hybrid systems. One of the first information 
and research aimed at separating bankruptcy systems friendly to debtors from those 
creditor-friendly was presented by P.R. Wood (1995), Q. Hussain and C. Wihlborg 
(1999), E. Berglöf, H. Rosenthal and E.L. von Thadden (2001), R.R. Bliss (2003), 
M. Falke (2003), G. Recasens (2004), S. Franken (2004), C. López-Gutiérrez, M. 
Olalla García and B. Torre Olmo (2005). In these publications, the authors both 
presented criteria that differentiate the two systems and attempted to qualify some 
countries as bankruptcy systems with regard to their friendliness to debtors and 
creditors. However, the classification of countries into individual bankruptcy 
regimes concerned a relatively small number of countries, apart from the research 
conducted by Z.R. Azar (2007), who proposed PDI (pro debtor index) and PCI (pro 
creditor index) and based on several criteria and data from 2003 assigned 50 
countries to more or less debtor or creditor-friendly systems.      
 
Based on the achievements so far, it is possible to distinguish the basic criteria 
differentiating the two types of systems. In debtor-friendly bankruptcy systems, the 
choice of reorganisation is more common than that of liquidation. These systems are 
often accused of treating creditors worse than debtors, and managers of an insolvent 
business unit are more often left in power after bankruptcy than in creditor-friendly 
systems. This is based on the assumption that managers know the problems of an 
insolvent company better and they should be left in charge. Therefore, the Absolute 
Priority Rule (APR) is often violated in this model. Importance in this approach is 
also attached to social issues, i.e. preserving jobs. An important criterion 
differentiating the two systems constitutes also the giving of preference to new 
sources of financing for a bankrupt debtor. This is to contribute to the maintenance 
of the activity within the business unit. Besides, R.R. Bliss (2003) points out to the 
fact that this system gives the possibility of protecting one's claims through the 
conclusion and implementation of the so-called ex-ante reciprocal agreements (e.g. 
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secured contracts, i.e. with collateral security and netting agreements - mutual 
compensation of claims with liabilities). 
 
In opposition to the above concept, the system promoting creditor assumes the best 
possible protection of creditors, removal of existing managers from the management 
of the company because they are blamed for financial problems, liquidation of the 
company because reorganisations have little effect and it often happens that 
companies, after unsuccessful restructuring processes, return to the path of 
liquidation proceedings, which generates high costs. Other differences concern the 
regulation of the possibility of deciding to accept or reject the reorganisation plan, 
creditors' voting on the plan and the so-called automatic stay, which is connected 
with e.g. lack of charging penal interest on liabilities, suspension of court 
enforcement, etc. as a result of bankruptcy. This system usually ignores reciprocal 
agreements because they favour one creditor over another. On the other hand, 
however, it supports the creation of the so-called groups of privileged claims, which, 
after all, violate the division of claims established before the declaration of 
bankruptcy. 
  




Based on the analysis of the literature, it was established that bankruptcy law plays a 
vital role in the economy. It constitutes one of the factors that influence, e.g. growth 
in entrepreneurship, innovativeness and thus, economic development. The issue 
connected to it was noticed in the EU countries and steps to implement the equal 
opportunities policy have been taken, this included, e.g. proposing directions for 
changes in national and EU bankruptcy laws. Therefore, it is crucial to evaluate and 
compare bankruptcy laws. For this reason, a comparative analysis of the 
friendliness/severity of bankruptcy law for debtors was assumed as the aim of this 
study. The research sample included EU countries (Austria, Croatia, Estonia, 
Finland, Greece, Lithuania, Latvia, Sweden, Germany, Bulgaria, the Czech 
Republic, France, Spain, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Hungary, 
Denmark, the Netherlands, Ireland, Italy), the United Kingdom (small EU countries 
and countries for which the authors were unable to obtain information about the 
bankruptcy law were not included) and the United States, Canada and Australia. The 
United States was assumed in this study as a benchmark, as this country is 
considered to have one of the best and most debtor-friendly bankruptcy laws in the 
world (Jackson and Skeel, 2013). Apart from the USA, the countries that rank high 
in the Resolving Insolvency ranking (Doing Business Report 2020), namely 
Australia and Canada were also included in the comparison. In Australia, similarly 
to the USA, common law is in force, while in Canada, both common and civil law is 
in force. The legal status of the end of 2019 was taken into account.   
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The comparative analysis was conducted using a quantitative method. To achieve 
the aim, a BLSI (Bankruptcy Law Severity Index for debtors) measure was 
developed, the value of which is between 0 and 1: 
 
0 – debtor-friendly bankruptcy law, 
1 – bankruptcy law severe (unfriendly) for debtors,  
 
BLSI is the arithmetic average of grades of the individual criteria included in the 
index. The authors did not decide to weigh the grades, as this could disturb the 
comparison by including subjectivity. The criteria were established based on 
literature analysis, experience and knowledge of the authors of the study. The first 
group of criteria, for which the grade range is <0;3>. The general evaluation 
principle was adopted, i.e.: 
 
0 – solutions very beneficial for the debtor,  
1 – significant number of solutions beneficial for the debtor,   
2 – a few solutions with no significance for the debtor, 
3 – proposed solutions are unfavourable for the debtor or there are no 
beneficial solutions for the debtor in this area of regulations. 
 
In order to implement these principles taking into account their specificity and 
objectivity, for each criterion, detailed rules have been proposed. 
  
1. Any kind of sanctions concerning debtor on account of carrying out 
bankruptcy proceedings, e.g. for failure to file a bankruptcy petition in due 
time or for the debtor's lack of cooperation with the court (criminal, civil 
law, administrative). The more such sanctions are imposed and the more 
severe they are for the debtor, the more severe the law is for them. In some 
analysed countries, there is the obligation to file a bankruptcy petition and a 
due date set. The obligation to file a petition and to set a due date indicates 
the severity of the law for debtors. The sanctions imposed for failure to file a 
bankruptcy petition in due date aggravate unfriendliness of the law for 
debtors. The law in the countries, where there are only sanctions for a 
debtor's actions unrelated to the failure to comply with the due date for filing 
a bankruptcy petition, e.g. for failure to cooperate with the court, are to be 
considered less severe for debtors.  
Detailed evaluation criteria: 
0 – liability only for debtor's actions not related to not filing a bankruptcy 
petition, excluding criminal liability. 
1 – liability only for debtor's actions not related to not filing a bankruptcy 
petition, including criminal liability, 
2 – civil or criminal liability for damage arising from not filing a bankruptcy 
petition, 
3 - civil and criminal liability for damage arising from not filing a 
bankruptcy petition. 
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2. Existence of different procedures for restructuring (concerning greater or 
lesser involvement of the court in restructuring proceedings). The more such 
procedures, the more debtor-friendly the law is. It is then possible to choose 
the most appropriate for the situation bankruptcy proceeding.  
Detailed evaluation criteria: 
0 – bankruptcy law separated from restructuring law. More than three 
restructuring procedures, 
1 – bankruptcy law separated from restructuring law. One or two 
restructuring procedures, 
2 – only one bankruptcy law including several restructuring procedures, 
3 – only one bankruptcy law including one restructuring procedure. 
3. Regulations on releasing from debt after the completion of bankruptcy or 
restructuring proceedings (period, conditions, type of entities to which 
possibility of realising from debt apply). The greater the chances of 
releasing from debt and the shorter the time that it might take to execute it, 
the more debtor-friendly the law is.  
Detailed evaluation criteria: 
0 – automatic releasing from debt, both for natural persons and 
entrepreneurs after completion of bankruptcy proceedings, with no 
additional conditions, 
1 – automatic realising from debt for natural persons and/or entrepreneurs 
provided that specified in the law conditions are fulfilled, 
2 – no automatic releasing from debt for either natural persons and 
entrepreneurs after the completion of bankruptcy proceedings. However, 
after fulfilling specified in the law conditions, automatic releasing from debt 
is possible for both natural and legal persons, 
3 – no releasing from debt for either natural persons and entrepreneurs after 
the completion of bankruptcy proceedings. 
4. Regulations concerning leaving the current management board or debtor-
managed (understood as a person managing business activity) in the event of 
opening bankruptcy or restructuring proceedings (debtor in possession). The 
more favourable the regulations for leaving the current debtor on managing 
position, the less severe they are for them; and if they are to encourage the 
court or creditors to appoint a new management board, e.g. in the form of 
licensed receivers or managers, the more severe they are for the debtor. 
Detailed evaluation criteria: 
0 – concerning both bankruptcy and restructuring proceedings, the court 
leaves company management to the debtor, 
1 – concerning bankruptcy proceedings, the court may leave the 
management to the debtor under supervision, and in restructuring 
proceedings, the court leaves the management to the debtor, 
2 – concerning bankruptcy proceedings, the court takes the management 
away from the debtor, and in restructuring proceedings it leaves the 
management to the debtor under supervision, 
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3 – concerning both bankruptcy and restructuring proceedings, the court 
takes away from the debtor the right to manage the company and transfers it 
to other entities.  
5. Rules of voting among creditors on a restructuring plan or arrangement and 
the occurrence of the so-called cramdown. The more restrictive, requiring a 
large majority of votes for the approval of restructuring proceedings or 
arrangement the law is, the more severe it is for the debtor. The occurrence 
of a cramdown, i.e. the possibility of accepting the arrangement or 
restructuring proceedings over the objection of some classes of creditors, 
including secured creditors, favours the debtor.  
Detailed evaluation criteria: 
0 – The voting majority (calculated based on the value of claims and/or the 
number of creditors) for the plan is 1/2 or less. In the case of voting in 
groups, there is a possibility of accepting the restructuring plan if some 
creditor groups have voted against the restructuring plan. There is a 
possibility of initiating a cramdown procedure, 
1 – The voting majority (calculated based on the value of claims and/or the 
number of creditors) for the plan is 6/10. In the case of voting in groups, 
there is a possibility of accepting the restructuring plan if some creditor 
groups have voted against the restructuring plan, under certain conditions. 
There is a possibility of initiating a cramdown procedure, 
2 – The voting majority (calculated based on the value of claims and/or the 
number of creditors) for the plan is at least 2/3. In the case of voting in 
groups, there is a possibility of accepting the restructuring plan if one group 
of creditors have voted against the restructuring plan, under certain 
conditions. There is a possibility of initiating a cramdown procedure to a 
limited extent, 
3 – The voting majority (calculated based on the value of claims and/or the 
number of creditors) for the plan is at least 3/4. In the case of voting in 
groups, all groups have to secure a majority that allows accepting the 
restructuring plan. There is no possibility of initiating a cramdown 
procedure. 
 
The second group of criteria, for which the grade range is <0;1>: 
0 – regulations that favour debtors exist;  
1 – no regulations that favour debtors. 
1. Suspension of bankruptcy proceedings in the case of applying to open 
restructuring proceedings. The existence of this ground is debtor-friendly, 
i.e. the law is less severe for the debtor.  
2. Special procedures for bankruptcy or restructuring proceedings, in particular 
for entities from the small and medium-sized enterprises (SME) sector. The 
existence of such procedures makes the law less severe for debtors.   
3. The regulation concerning so-called pre-pack – prepared liquidation, sale of 
a bankrupt's enterprise with no necessity of carrying out activities required 
in bankruptcy proceedings, it can be initiated before initiation of bankruptcy 
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proceedings (whether there is a possibility of initiation of such procedure 
and whether there are any limitations to its application). The fewer 
restrictions and the existence of regulations concerning pre-pack make the 
law more debtor-friendly. 
4. New financing – a new loan in a form of preferential claim and the 
possibility of converting the claim into shares. The existence of such 
possibility of new financing is more debtor-friendly, lack of it or 
insignificant possibilities indicate the severity of the law for the debtor. 
5. Deadline for filing a bankruptcy petition. The longer the time for filing a 
bankruptcy petition from the moment of the occurrence of circumstances, 
the more friendly the law is to the debtor.  
 
A team of 3 people (authors of the study), who have knowledge and experience in 
research of bankruptcy, was appointed to evaluate the individual criteria. Based on 
the collected data, each of these 3 people evaluated individual bankruptcy and/or 
restructuring laws according to the given criterion. Each of the authors assigned a 
grade, based on the indicated range, to each criterion and the minimum change of 
variable was set at 0.5 (intermediate grade – a regulation is more severe for the 
debtor than the one from a lower grade and less severe than the one from a higher 
grade). Unlike many previous studies, the evaluation for all countries included in the 
study was carried out by each member of the research team. Comparing bankruptcy 
regulations based on evaluations by another person for each country may cause some 
problems concerning subjectivity. In the next step, the arithmetic average of grades 
given by each researchers for each criterion was determined. It allowed, to some 
extent, to objectivize the analysis, as it was not based solely on the evaluation of 
individuals. For each criterion, normalisation has been made, so that the final 
evaluation is within 0 - 1. Normalisation consisted in dividing the arithmetic average 
of grades by the maximum level. In addition to an aggregated evaluation of 
severity/friendliness of bankruptcy and restructuring laws for debtors, these actions 
also allow for the comparison of bankruptcy and restructuring laws concerning 




The results obtained based on the conducted research are presented in Tables 1. and 
2. as well as in Figure 1. In table 1 the averaged results for the analysed countries on 
basis of experts' indications for individual criteria included in the BLSI measure are 
presented.  Table 2. contains normalised results and BLSI measure values for the 
analysed countries. In Figure 1 BLSI for each country, concerning the median, and 
centre values of BLSI measure, which range is <0;1>, were compared. This centre 
value, i.e. 0.5 marking the line between countries with more or less debtor-friendly 
bankruptcy and restructuring laws.  
 
The research shows that countries characterized by low BLSI (below 0.5), i.e. the 
ones with more debtor-friendly bankruptcy and restructuring law are: Canada (0.24), 
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France (0.38), Greece (0.41), Ireland (0.26), Italy (0.38), Lithuania (0.40) and the 
United States (0.18), example of which other countries can follow. Countries with 
high BLSI (above 0.5), i.e. with less debtor-friendly bankruptcy and restructuring 
law are: Australia (0.71), Austria (0.73), Croatia (0.68), Czech Republic (0.67), 
Denmark (0.56), the United Kingdom (0.54), Estonia (0.56), Finland (0.58), 
Germany (0.64), Hungary (0.70), Latvia (0.55), the Netherlands (0.58), Portugal 
(0.66), Romania (0.57), Slovakia (0.56), Slovenia (0.81) and Sweden (0.60). Poland 
(0.50) and Spain (0.50) are on the line between countries with less and more debtor-
friendly bankruptcy and restructuring laws.  
 
The analysis of the research results show that BLSI index for most countries is 
between 0.30 and 0.70. Including: Lithuania (0.40), Greece (0.41), Spain (0.50), 
Poland (0.50), the United Kingdom (0.54), Latvia (0.55), Denmark (0.56), Estonia 
(0.56), Slovakia (0.56), Romania (0.57), Finland (0.58), the Netherlands (0.58), 
Sweden (0.60), Germany (0.64), Portugal (0.66), Czech Republic (0.67), Croatia 
(0.68) and Hungary (0.70). In many of the above-mentioned countries, the index of 
severity of bankruptcy and restructuring law is around 0.50. Including: Spain (0.50), 
Poland (0.50), the United Kingdom (0.54), Latvia (0.55), Denmark (0.56), Estonia 
(0.56), Slovakia (0.56), Romania (0.57), Finland (0.58), the Netherlands (0.58). 
Countries with BLSI between 0.30 and 0.70 are members of the European Union.  
 
The countries with the most debtor-friendly bankruptcy and restructuring laws, 
low BLSI (below 0.30) are: the United States (0.18), Canada (0.24) and Ireland 
(0.26). Factors affecting low BLSI index: 
 
1. No obligation on the part of the managers to file a bankruptcy petition of the 
entrepreneur, and thus there are no possible sanctions for failure to file a 
petition within the set time limit. 
2. Priority of restructuring over bankruptcy. In the case of filing a restructuring 
or bankruptcy petition, the court examines a restructuring petition first. 
3. Possibility of automatic releasing from debt after completion of bankruptcy 
or restructuring proceedings. 
4. Possibility to initiate special procedures concerning bankruptcy or 
restructuring proceedings for small and medium-sized enterprises. 
5. Prepack - prepared liquidation. 
6. Possibility of new financing and privileges for creditors granting loans 
during restructuring proceedings. 
 
Countries with the least debtor-friendly bankruptcy and restructuring laws, with 
high BLSI (above 0.70) are: Australia (0.70), Austria (0.73) and Slovenia (0.81). 
Factors affecting high BLSI index: 
 
1. Regulations concerning the obligation and deadline for filing a bankruptcy 
petition and the time set for filing a petition. 
2. No priority for restructuring over bankruptcy. 
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3. A small number of available restructuring procedures. 
4. No possibility to initiate special procedures concerning bankruptcy or 
restructuring proceedings for small and medium-sized enterprises. 
5. No pre-pack - prepared liquidation. 
6. No possibility of new financing and privileges for creditors granting loans 
during restructuring proceedings. 
 
Regulations concerning the obligation to file a bankruptcy petition and the time set 
for filing it are factors affecting BLSI index significantly (the longer the deadline, 
the more lenient the bankruptcy law is for the debtor). If the bankruptcy law provides 
for an obligation on the part of managers to file a bankruptcy petition and a deadline 
for filing it, sanctions for failure to comply are automatically included in the legal 
regulations. It can include sanctions provided for in both civil and criminal law.  The 
significant impact of these regulations on the BLSI index stems from the fact these 
two factors were taken into account when evaluating the severity of bankruptcy and 
restructuring laws.  
 
For example, in countries with a low BLSI index, i.e. in the United States, according 
to the bankruptcy law, there is no obligation for members of the management board 
to file for bankruptcy. Members of the management board will not be held 
responsible if they continue to conduct the company's affairs, even if they knew or, 
using their best efforts, could have predicted that the company was/would become 
insolvent. Members of the management board are only obliged to conduct the affairs 
of the company with due diligence, taking into account the best possible interest of 
all stakeholders (as a result of failure to meet this obligation, the member of the 
management board may be subject to civil liability). Similarly, in Canada, there is no 
obligation under bankruptcy law for members of the management board to file for 
bankruptcy. Members of the management board are obliged to conduct the 
company's affairs with due diligence, taking into account the best possible interest of 
the company (and only the company, as the management board is not obliged to act 
in the interest of creditors, shareholders or other interested parties, even if a state of 
insolvency arises).  
 
Therefore, where there is a conflict between the interests of the company and those 
of creditors, members of the management board are obliged to act in the best 
interests of the company. In Ireland, bankruptcy law does not provide for an 
obligation to file for bankruptcy (there is no formal requirement to file for 
bankruptcy within a certain period); moreover, members of the management board 
do not even have a legal standing to file a bankruptcy petition. However, they do 
have the legal standing (but not an obligation) to file for the appointment of an 
administrator ("examiner") to a company that is insolvent or at risk of insolvency. If 
members of the management board know or should, using their best efforts, 
anticipate that the company will become insolvent, they are obliged to take actions 
for the benefit of creditors aimed at minimising potential losses, i.e. to maintain the 
existing liquidity.  
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In countries with a high BLSI index (Australia, Austria and Slovenia), bankruptcy 
law provides for an obligation to file for bankruptcy. In Australia, the law prohibits 
companies from conducting business in the state of insolvency. Directors who do not 
prevent the company from indebtedness in a state of insolvency face civil and 
criminal liability. They may also be required to pay compensation. In Austria, in the 
event of a lack of liquidity or over-indebtedness, the debtor is obligated to file for the 
initiation of insolvency proceedings without culpable delay, but in no case later than 
60 days after the occurrence of the debtor's lack of liquidity and/or over-
indebtedness. If the debtor and/or the management board of the debtor does not file 
for bankruptcy within the required deadline, they become personally liable to the 
creditors for any damage resulting from the delay in filing a bankruptcy petition to 
the court. In Slovenia, in the event of a company's insolvency, the management 
board submits a report to the Supervisory Board on the possibility of financial 
restructuring within one month of insolvency. The Supervisory Board issues an 
opinion within 5 days and communicates it to the Management Board. The 
Management Board, in turn, has 3 days to file a bankruptcy petition if the opinion on 
the condition of the company indicates that such petition is justified. 
 
Taking into account the components of the BLSI measure, the most important 
conclusions are as follows: 
 
1. Sanctions for failure to file for bankruptcy within a specified period or for 
failure to cooperate with the court are still high in many countries.  
2. An increasing number of countries offers the possibility of suspending the 
bankruptcy proceedings in favour of the implementation of restructuring 
proceedings, which should be viewed positively. 
3. The number of possible restructuring paths is still relatively small in many 
countries. It should be noted that their number does not always translate into 
the effectiveness of the proceedings. On the one hand, the more methods of 
conducting restructuring proceedings, the more appropriate restructuring 
path can be chosen by the debtor. On the other hand, the knowledge and 
experience of administrators and bankruptcy judges, as well as their ability 
to cooperate with stakeholders (mainly debtors and creditors), are often the 
decisive factors for the success of restructuring.    
4. Relatively many countries offer no simplified procedures for smaller 
businesses. It seems that such proceedings should be adopted in the 
bankruptcy law as they reduce the costs of conducting them and, due to 
lower requirements, make them easier for debtors to conduct.  
5. A growing number of countries have introduced regulations concerning pre-
pack proceedings, which should be assessed positively.  
6. In many countries, a debtor may be released from outstanding debts in the 
framework of bankruptcy proceedings, although it is often subject to various 
restrictions. It is only automatic in a few countries.    
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7. In many countries, the debtor can continue managing the company, but 
mainly after the restructuring proceedings have been initiated and often 
under the supervision of a supervisor.  
8. A positive feature is that more and more countries are introducing 
regulations to give preference to new financing of entities conducting 
restructuring proceedings. This is aimed at contributing to the success of 
these activities and keeping companies on the market.  
9. In many countries, the law indicates a specific time limit for initiating 
bankruptcy proceedings if a specific premise occurs. However, it should be 
noted that there are also relatively many countries in which this rule has 
been abandoned.   
10. As far as the rules of voting and acceptance of an arrangement by creditors 
are concerned, they are generally similar and there are relatively small 
differences.  
 
Figure 1. Comparison of the BLSI measure values for the analysed countries and 
against the median and middle value of BLSI of 0.5 
 
Source: Authors’ own study. 
 
4. Conclusions  
 
The measure we proposed allowed us to compare bankruptcy and restructuring laws 
of the countries from the point of view of their friendliness/severity towards 
insolvent debtors.  
 
The greatest friendliness of the law towards debtors was observed in the USA, 
Ireland and Canada. Among the EU countries, there are still differences in 
bankruptcy and restructuring laws and it can be seen that measures are being taken 
to reduce them, for example through to the introduction of legal instruments such as 
directives. Thus, the last Directive (EU) of the European Parliament and the Council 
of 20 June 2019 on preventive restructuring frameworks, on the discharge of debt 
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and disqualifications, and on measures to increase the efficiency of procedures 
concerning restructuring, insolvency and discharge of debt, and amending Directive 
(EU) 2017/1132, so called Directive on restructuring and insolvency (2019), points 
out and recommends that the differences between the EU countries' regulations on 
preventive restructuring should be balanced.  In the opinion of the European Union, 
differences between the Member States with regard to the procedures concerning 
restructuring, insolvency and discharge of debt translate into additional costs for 
investors when assessing the risk of debtors getting into financial difficulties in one 
or more Member States, or the risk associated with investing in viable companies in 
financial difficulties, as well as costs related to the restructuring of companies whose 
establishments, creditors or assets are located in the other Member States. The 
results of the survey indicate relatively small differences in the severity of 
bankruptcy and restructuring law between the majority of Member States 
participating in the study. However, several countries still exhibit the characteristics 
of countries with creditor-friendly law and show little focus on restructuring 
activities.  
 
Preliminary observation of data on the effectiveness of bankruptcy law, resulting 
from the annual reports of the World Bank, in comparison with the BLSI measure 
in the countries studied, shows that the level of BLSI is not related to the 
effectiveness of bankruptcy law, calculated in terms of the recovery rate for 
creditors. Research shows that in countries with the lowest BLSI, i.e. the most 
debtor-friendly countries, the recovery rate for creditors is as high as in countries 
with the highest BLSI, i.e. the least debtor-friendly countries. Thus, in the 
countries with the lowest rates of the severity of bankruptcy and restructuring 
laws, the average recovery rate for creditors in 2010-2020 was 88% in the USA, 
95% in Canada, 94% in Ireland, while in the countries with high severity rates, 
the recovery rate was 87% in Australia, 85% in Austria and 73% in Slovenia 
(Doing Business Data).  
 
Therefore, the conclusion of the research is positive. The introduction of solutions 
in the bankruptcy and restructuring law that favour debtors do not have to 
translate into the deterioration of creditors' rights in these proceedings. The low 
BLSI index may, in turn, have a positive impact on the development of 
entrepreneurship, calculated as the survival rate of entrepreneurs and the number 
of newly registered entrepreneurs, as well as on innovative initiatives taken by 
entrepreneurs. The above-mentioned dependence requires in-depth research and 
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Source: Authors’ own study based on the legal status in force in individual countries on 31 December 2019 (for a full list of legal acts and 
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Table 2: Standardised assessments of individual component criteria in the BLSI measure and BLSI values for 
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Source: Authors’ own study based on the legal status in force in individual countries on 31 December 2019 (for a full list of legal acts and 
literature, see References).  
